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Abstract 
With regard to agri-environmental schemes under Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 in Europe 
a rather divers uptake as well as a lack of effectiveness and efficiency of these current 
schemes can be observed. In contrast to most of the related literature, we suggest that the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency is inherent to the way those schemes are currently 
institutionalised in the framework of European agricultural policies. The paper draws on ex-
periences made within the GRANO research project on Approaches for Sustainable Agricul-
tural Production in Northeast Germany. Among other sub-projects, round tables, so-called 
Agri-Environmental Forums (AEF), were installed in two districts in Brandenburg to integrate 
local actors directly into the process of designing and implementing local agri-environmental 
schemes in order to improve their economic and ecological efficiency. While the participants 
were successful in designing such local scheme, it did not become part of the Rural Develop-
ment Plan in Brandenburg. Based on this case study, we argue that the process of designing 
agri-environmental schemes in Germany can be conceptualised as a rather complex 
negotiation process at Laender level. The institutional settings in which this negotiation 
process takes place shape the possible outcomes and, thus, the design of the schemes. With 
only passive support for decentralised and participatory approaches, yet compulsory com-
plex bureaucratic procedures on part of the EU, there are no incentives for the administration 
at Laender level to actively support those approaches. Further, it can not be expected that the 
lack of effectiveness and efficiency can be wiped out completely from the current European 
Agri-environmental Policy framework. Therefore, we have to drop the assumption that agri-
environmental issues in general can be solved through agri-environmental schemes alone.  
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1 Introduction 
The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, the introduction of the 
Agenda 2000, and also the recently presented Mid-Term Review exemplify a new trend in 
agricultural policy in the European Union (EU) towards an agri-environmental policy and a 
policy for rural development. Among other things, agri-environmental schemes (AES) have 
been developed to remunerate environmental services provided by farmers within the frame-
work of EU regulations, such as Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999. In recent years, agricultural 
economists and other rural researchers have paid a lot of attention to the new policy area 
mostly in the context of ongoing policy evaluations.1 Additionally, agri-environmental 
schemes have been subject to evaluation by EU organisations (e.g., European Court of Audi-
tors 2000) and policy actors (Dwyer et al. 2002). Although the general trajectory of shifting 
policy instruments has been welcomed by most academics the detailed analysis of agri-
environmental schemes has given room for quite substantial criticism. 
The most striking observation has been the rather divers uptake of the opportunities offered 
in the former Regulation (EEC) No. 2078/1992 as well as in the current Rural Development 
Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999. This can be said for the relative share of agri-environmental 
spending as well as for the design of agri-environmental schemes. Since nation states seem to 
run rather different strategies towards agri-environmental issues the divers uptake cannot 
solely be explained by different natural conditions and farm structures. In Germany, due to 
the fact that the 16 Laender are in charge of the design and implementation of rural develop-
ment policies, agri-environmental schemes vary widely within the country. 
Diversity itself might not be an issue, if it were not related to a lack of effectiveness of 
agri-environmental schemes and low efficiency. However, while most of the agricultural eco-
nomics literature is quick to suggest more effective measures to monitor farmers behaviour, 
the questions remains, why agri-environmental schemes are offered that have little or even no 
environmental effect at all? Addressing the issue from this perspective turns the focus on a set 
of actors agricultural economists rarely address: the agricultural administration and the policy 
system at the regional level. The easiest hypothesis would be to assume an unwillingness of 
regional politicians to demand considerable efforts from farmers. Indeed, such arguments 
                                                 
1  Compare, e.g., Baudoux (2001); Brouwer and Lowe (2002); Buller, Wilson and Höll (2000); Hagedorn 
(2002); Huylenbroeck and Withby (1999); Kazenwadel (1999); Marggraf (2003); OECD (2001); Osterburg 
and Nieberg 2001; Primdahl et al. (2003); SRU (1996); Wilhelm (1999); Wilson, Petersen and Höll (1999). 
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have been already exploited (Ahrens, Lippert and Rittershofer 2000). Environmental argu-
ments may serve as tools to create legitimisation for agricultural subsidies. In general, re-
search into the political economy supports the view that agricultural lobbies maintain a strong 
influence on the design and shape of agricultural policies (Hagedorn 1993; Eggers and Hage-
dorn 1998). However, this argument alone might not be sufficient. On the one hand, the in-
creasing criticism caused by unresolved agri-environmental issues remains. On the other 
hand, there are measures that are indeed very demanding for farmers and environmentally 
effective. 
Thus, a closer attention should be paid to another hypothesis. The lack of environmental 
effectiveness may be caused by insufficient decision-making and a weak performance of the 
agricultural administrative system itself. Although, as we will outline in the following section, 
there are several arguments that have been raised in the discussion supporting this view, until 
now little systematic research has been undertaken. This is very surprising, given the market 
adoring rhetoric that many agricultural economists like to apply. Our own starting point, how-
ever, is a different one. Rather than to propose that either market mechanisms or top-down 
measures, like the EU agri-environmental policy organised by state bureaucracies, are the 
only solutions, we suggest that several institutional2 solutions have to be found to address the 
variety of environmental as well as social conditions. Indeed, we argue that hybrid institu-
tional arrangements - forms of co-operation, local structures of self-organisation and networks 
- have to play a significant role to develop sustainable agriculture (Hagedorn 2001; Hagedorn, 
Arzt and Peters 2002). 
This paper is based on experiences made in the context of the GRANO research project on 
Approaches for Sustainable Agricultural Production in Northeast Germany. In 1999 and 
2000, respectively, so-called Agri-Environmental Forums (AEF) were established in two rural 
areas of the German Land Brandenburg. These forums are round tables that were initiated to 
seek for solutions to agri-environmental problems and to foster local co-operation.3 This paper 
focuses on the activities and results of one of these AEF. One of the experiences obtained was 
that while the round table appeared to be rather successful in the analysis of agri-
                                                 
2  Following Douglas North, institutions are the man-made constraints that structure political, economic, and 
social interactions. These consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) (North 1990). In other words, 
institutions are the rules of the game or the rule of conduct within which human actions take place. 
3  See Arzt et al. (2002) for more comprehensive information on the background and main results of the 
research project, in general, and of the AEF, in particular.  
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environmental problems, it failed at implementation. The participants of this Agri-
Environmental Forum, for instance, were absolutely able to design an agri-environmental 
scheme to meet their perceived needs. At this stage, however, problems actually started. Al-
though the GRANO project had a high political backup and a lot of political and public atten-
tion was paid to its results, attempts failed to install at least some of the proposals made by the 
AEF. It became obvious that it would not be sufficient to simply encourage participatory ap-
proaches at the local level. Such approaches would have to be linked vertically to the existing 
political system. An issue that Elinor Ostrom described in her seminal work as one of several 
design principles for successful and sustainable local self-governance: the nesting in the 
wider political system (Ostrom 1990). While the general message appears to be rather obvious 
the question what this would entail, in general, and what would it mean for the European agri-
environmental policy, in particular, remains. 
In this paper, in order to make a first step, we attempt to analyse the regional administra-
tions argumentation and behaviour and aim to develop an understanding of the actual action 
situation of designing an agri-environmental scheme. The paper proceeds as follows. In 
Section 2 we briefly summarise the current German, and partly European, debate on agri-
environmental schemes. In Section 3, we introduce the basic concept of the Agri-
Environmental Forum and describe its concrete activities and results as well as the negotiation 
process with the Brandenburg Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Forestry (MLUR) while 
trying to implement the AEF results. Subsequently, in Section 4 we identify and discuss fac-
tors that contributed to the failure of implementing the Local Agri-Environmental Scheme 
(LAES). Based on this analysis we sketch out the decision-making process in order to explain 
why agri-environmental schemes are designed in a particular way. 
2 Institutional Aspects of Agri-environmental Policies in Germany 
Although agricultural economists have not yet provided a comprehensive institutional analy-
sis of the current bureaucratic agri-environmental regime in the framework of the CAP, litera-
ture still indicates various issues related to this question. The most common suggestion is that 
the lack of effectiveness can be traced back to the conflict of interest that is internal to agri-
environmental schemes in the EU. The existence of two concurring objectives - farm income 
support and environmental improvements - make it inevitable that the environmental effec-
tiveness suffers. This argument very much supports the unwillingness hypothesis described 
by Ahrens, Lippert and Rittershofer (2000). It has been argued, however, that international 
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agreements may make it necessary to separate those objectives more clearly  
(Holm-Müller and Witzke 2002). This has formally been undertaken.  
Yet, the general assumption of overcompensation has to be questioned. Some authors draw 
a more differentiated picture. In marginal regions, for instance, those measures that aim at 
extensifying the production have an additional positive effect as they give farmers an incen-
tive to keep the land under production. In areas with high quality soils, however, the extensi-
fication payments usually do not fully compensate the economic loss due to comparatively 
high opportunity costs (Deblitz 1999; Osterburg 2002). This means that very often the income 
losses that are actually experienced when measures are applied depend on the soil quality and 
on other local conditions that can be quite different even within a Land in Germany. Never-
theless, the design of the measures and the level of payments are not differentiated accord-
ingly. Thus, as a matter of fact, farmers in intensively used arable areas tend to participate 
much less in such schemes than their colleagues farming on marginal land. This lack of dif-
ferentiation has also been criticised by the European Court of Auditors (2000). The common 
suggestion is that premiums should be differentiated according to local conditions. Yet, little 
is known, why this has rarely been applied so far. 
It has also been suggested that lack of effectiveness results from the fact that the present 
agri-environmental schemes neither consider local environmental conditions nor local peo-
ples interest and their specific problems sufficiently (Deblitz 1999; Buller 2000; Lowe and 
Baldock 2000). As a result, in some cases measures are developed that are poorly adapted to 
the local ecological, economic, and also cultural conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness as 
well as the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental schemes varies widely (Wilhelm 2001; 
Marggraf 2003). Yet, this is not in line with the original objectives of agri-environmental pro-
grammes. At this point, the European Commission argues that most Member States (of the 
European Union) simply do not fully exploit the new scope and opportunities offered by the 
EU (Fischler 2000). 
Regarding individual measures agricultural economists regularly stress that effectiveness 
as well as efficiency would increase, if result-oriented rather than action-oriented remunera-
tion were applied (e.g., Hampicke 2001). Further, the lack of flexibility of requirements has 
regularly been criticised (Hampicke 2001; Jungcurt, Laschewski and Schleyer 2004). Also, 
agri-environmental schemes regularly require the participation of farmers for at least five 
years. The subsequent renewal of those contracts, however, cannot be guaranteed. In cases 
that require investments this may negatively affect the willingness of farmers to commit 
themselves to such contracts and, consequently, the introduction of long-term contracts has 
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been suggested (Hampicke 2001; Schramek 2001). Until now, this recommendation has had 
little or no effect on the design of current agri-environmental schemes. 
In this paper we argue that these problems addressed by agricultural economists are inher-
ent to the current policy regime that is based on contracts between state agencies and farmers 
about the provision of environmental goods. Yet, not only the contract approach itself has to 
be critically examined, but also the institutional context in which contracts are applied. Some 
of the issues addressed here, such as the lack of flexibility, are specific to agri-environmental 
schemes in the EU and have been solved much more successfully in other institutional envi-
ronments, such as Contractual Nature Conservation Schemes (Vertragsnaturschutz) (Bussche 
2001). In principal the restrictions of the policy regime are closely related to, often implicit, 
assumptions underlying conventional analysis such as neo-classical economics. Agri-
environmental schemes within the CAP are accordingly based on the idea that they are com-
plementary to other policy measures and also in addition to the basic compliance of farmers 
with legal minimum standards (good farming practice). The basic difference between ap-
plication of more restrictive legislation or payments for the provision of environmental 
goods is understood as a question of allocation of property rights (Scheele 2001). As long as 
farmers are considered to have the right to pollute society must compensate. However, in par-
ticular with respect to biodiversity, many extensive forms of farming, that are perceived to be 
environmentally very effective, are, under current economic conditions, economically not 
feasible (Hampicke 2001). Here, payments to farmers may be given even if they do not have 
the rights to the respective nature components. Even though we also see the crucial impor-
tance of understanding property rights, we argue that the way it is conceptualised is insuffi-
cient. Therefore, conventional analysis () makes assumptions that tend to exclude possible 
policy options from consideration (Hodge 2001: 103), and appears to be blind to its limita-
tions. The concept itself is starting from a set of very restrictive propositions:  
1. Availability of consensus about environmental objectives: This assumption puts the focus 
especially on the issue of implementation rather than decision-making. Thus, in the re-
search and evaluation practice agricultural economists tend to draw on environmental ex-
perts statements. Those experts seem to know what is good or bad. This does not neces-
sarily comply with the economists own view that consumers willingness to pay does not 
necessarily go along with environmental scarcity. It is a well-known fact that some sym-
bolic species may attract much more public attention than others. In consumers perception 
aesthetic aspects may also play a more important role than detailed materialistic accounts, 
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which are favoured by natural scientists. So far, European agri-environmental policies ap-
pear to follow a very science-based approach to nature. But even the assumption of a 
given, unchallenged objective position of natural sciences is unrealistic. Scientific knowl-
edge about the environment is characterised by tremendous uncertainties. At the same 
time, scientists are rarely in the position to define independently what an environmental 
problem is. The effectiveness of agri-environmental schemes, therefore, may differ de-
pending on the existence of shared perceptions of stakeholders about environmental objec-
tives. Hence, evaluation of environmental instruments has to take the objectives of the ac-
tors into account (e.g., Mickwitz 2003). 
2. Availability of knowledge and information: With regard to the actual situation the main-
stream discourse either implicitly assumes the availability of knowledge about linkages of 
farming practices with environmental outcomes, the availability of practical solutions to 
environmental problems and of relevant process information to all actors, or it simply ig-
nores this question. Accordingly, the process of invention, design and adaptation of 
schemes as well as their implementation would not cause any - at least no significant - 
transaction costs. In the assessment of agri-environmental schemes this is usually reflected 
in the fact that administration costs are not taken into consideration at all. However, as Fal-
coner and Whitby (1999) have shown, transaction costs of policy implementation are not 
identical to administrative cost. For example, farmers may be confronted with significant 
transaction costs, too. Due to the nature of many agri-environmental issues, such as com-
plexity and system dynamics, and because of the uneven distribution of information about 
behaviour patterns and outcomes between farmers, environmental experts and different 
administrations transaction costs involved may be considerable. In fact, regions at a sub-
national level have deplored increasing administrative costs related to agri-environmental 
scheme implementation (e.g., Osterburg 2002). Therefore, we conclude that in many cir-
cumstances those institutional arrangements that pay more attention to communication 
processes and to the exchange of knowledge and information are more suitable to solve 
agri-environmental problems. 
3. State and market: Derived from neo-classical theory the conceptualisation of current agri-
environmental schemes is also based on a misleading dichotomy of state and market. Mar-
kets are somehow referred to as entities that exist outside the state, whereas the state is 
sometimes referred to as one big bureaucracy. The existence of market failures (external 
effects) is the main argument for the provision of agri-environmental schemes by the state. 
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But the notion of a free market without or prior to the state is an ideological abstraction. 
No market is possible without a society to provide it with moral, legal, political and admin-
istrative foundations. (Bell and Lowe 2000: 286). Similarly, the concept of the state as a 
bureaucratic monolith does not reflect the reality adequately. In Europe, the state may be 
separated into sets of organisations at different levels (Europe, Nation State, Region, Mu-
nicipalities). Arising from this observation, one important issue has been the question of al-
location of competencies to lower levels of the political decision-making process (devolu-
tion or regionalisation). Based on the concept of fiscal federalism some authors tried to 
identify appropriate levels for a number of environmental issues (Robert Bosch Stiftung 
2000; Ewers and Hassel 2000; Ewringmann and Bergmann 2000; Rudloff and Urfei 2000; 
Hampicke et al. 2000; Zeddies, Baudoux and Koll 2000). However, Hagedorn (2001) ar-
gued that this approach was insufficient since it was mainly focussing on the spatial fea-
tures of environmental problems. Instead, he suggested that, from a theoretical point of 
view, the issue of regionalisation should be considered as subordinate to the development 
of a more profound understanding of the nature of the respective environmental problems 
at hand. The concept of the monolithic state may also be questioned from a different per-
spective. If we consider the provision of public goods as a core function of governmental 
institutions, we observe the tendency of states to make use of a wide range of institutional 
arrangements, such as governmental and quasi-governmental, but also intermediary or-
ganisations (chambers, associations, etc.) and private businesses. These very divers and of-
ten hybrid forms of governance are necessary because the provision of public goods regu-
larly requires inputs that are not under full control of a single public sector principal. Elinor 
Ostrom, therefore, suggests to consider the provision of public goods as co-production, i.e., 
as a process through which inputs are used to produce a good or services are contributed 
by individuals, who are not in the same organisation. (Ostrom 1996: 1073) This may re-
quire the active involvement of co-producers, e.g., farmers, as well as the recipients in the 
production and decision-making processes. 
4. Environmental goods as products of individual farmers: In agri-environmental schemes, 
state agencies are contracting with individual farmers. This implies that individual farmers 
on individual plots can provide environmental goods. Yet, many environmental goods (or 
bads) to be produced (or not), such as cultural landscapes and nitrogen surplus in a water-
shed, are collective goods. They often require co-ordinated activities among farmers and/or 
with planning authorities. In this light, the assessment of agri-environmental schemes 
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without considering complementary measures and planning activities, as it is the current 
practice of evaluating agri-environmental schemes, appears to be a futile undertaking. 
Further points of criticism are the very restrictive (implicit or explicit) behavioural assump-
tions most agricultural economists employ (Hodge 2001). Here, farmers are described as 
short-term, single (income) preference optimising calculators. Although we also consider 
farm income as a very important objective to understand farmers behaviour, we argue that 
farmers may show high preferences for environmental protection, too. Under certain cir-
cumstances, they even have a self- serving interest to manage their (own) productive envi-
ronmental resources sustainably. Finally, although statistics indicate that in the context of 
agrarian restructuring less and less agriculturally productive land is owned by the farmers 
themselves, little attention has been paid to this question. Farmers are conceptually treated 
as landowners; an assumption that is not supported by reality anymore. 
Taking the discussion above into account, we can neither assume that market solutions in 
general may be considered as optimal for agri-environmental issues, nor that the current agri-
environmental policy in the EU does provide the only or at least most important solution. In-
stead, various institutional arrangements may emerge and need to be designed in a way that 
reflects divers environmental as well as social conditions. Therefore, we have to drop the as-
sumption that agri-environmental issues in general can be solved through agri-environmental 
schemes alone. It is important to understand the specifics of the European agri-environmental 
policies. Only if we develop a clear understanding of both, its strengths and its limitations, we 
may be able to evaluate its performance and, subsequently, to design alternative arrangements 
for various environmental concerns, but also for divers social and institutional environments. 
Since agri-environmental schemes constitute an important element of current European agri-
environmental policy, in this paper, we focus on the question of designing those schemes. 
The most common interpretation of the specific constraints experienced by regional (in 
Germany, the Laender level) agricultural ministries is the idea of them being restricted both 
by demands from the federal ministry and from the European CAP (doppelte Politikverflech-
tung) (Mehl and Plankl 2002). Here, co-financing functions are very strong incentives for the 
regional administration to comply with the objectives of the policies supported by a higher 
level administration. Although the existence of a federal as well as European level may cause 
tensions, it also offers room for manoeuvre for regional administrations since they can opt 
either for support from one or the other level or even for combining funding opportunities 
from both levels. Balancing constraints and existing financial opportunities, therefore, is a 
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characteristic feature of rural policy making at the regional level. Thus, if we address the issue 
of the design of Rural Development Plans (RDP) at the regional level, maximising external 
funding may be seen as an important objective on part of the regional administration.  
This institutional setting favours the pivotal position of the regional administration while 
regional parliaments are outplayed since their basic function has been reduced to only approve 
the complementary budget to schemes that have already been negotiated between the different 
administrative players (Laschewski, Teherani-Kroenner and Bahner 2002). Yet, political 
competition remains partly important as was argued by Ahrens, Lippert and Rittershofer 
(2000) based on experiences in the German Land Saxony-Anhalt. They suggest that the avail-
ability of external funding also puts pressure on the regional administration not only to maxi-
mise the inflow of external funding, but also to spend the money successfully. Clearly, a gov-
ernment that fails to spend available funds offers the opposition a wide door for public criti-
cism. Consequently, the acceptance of the offered schemes by potential recipients is also an 
important issue for the scheme design. Thus, the administration most likely will apply strate-
gies to ensure acceptance of the schemes such as the application of intensive communication 
with the clientele, low formal requirements, attractive financial conditions, and it will avoid 
complicated formal procedures.  
Furthermore, designing agri-environmental schemes is not only about drawing money into 
the region and directing the funds through the administrative to the political clientele; it is 
also about managing the schemes themselves. As we argued earlier, costs of monitoring and 
enforcing regulations may be significant. This assumption has already been validated, thus, 
the costs of managing agri-environmental schemes have become more and more a concern for 
regional administrations (Osterburg 2002; Ahrens, Lippert and Rittershofer 2000).  
Beyond the relevance of budget concerns, Wilson, Petersen and Höll (1999) also stress the 
importance of the regional history of agri-environmental schemes for understanding the way 
new schemes are implemented. In principal, they suggest the existence of path dependencies, 
that may occur because there might be complementary institutions. For example, changes of 
rules at one level may depend on changes of rules at another level (North 1990). Indeed, as 
was already outlined, in the case of agri-environmental schemes regional decisions are subject 
to approval by higher levels of administration. Therefore, it may be costly to change an al-
ready approved scheme. Further arguments for the existence of path dependencies are, for 
example, past investments in knowledge and the emergence of interest groups with a vested 
interest in certain institutional arrangements (North 1990). In the case of agri-environmental 
schemes, learning costs are not only caused by the environmental issues themselves, but also 
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by the processes necessary to develop successful strategies, to learn about farmers responses 
and to cope with the formal bureaucratic procedures of the European policy system. 
3 The Case Study 
In this Section we will first outline the basic concept of the Agri-Environmental Forum (AEF) 
and describe briefly concrete activities and results of the AEF in the Prenzlau-West region4. 
We will then focus on the negotiation process with the MLUR while trying to implement the 
Local Agri-Environmental Scheme (LAES). Here, we will concentrate on the period after the 
LAES was agreed on by the actors5. This case study is based on experiences made within the 
GRANO research project conducted between 1998 and 2002. GRANO stands for “Ap-
proaches for Sustainable Agricultural Production in Northeast Germany”, an R&D project 
that was carried out jointly by research organisations of the Laender Berlin and Brandenburg. 
The GRANO approach was based upon the perception that applied concepts for the sustain-
able use of agricultural landscapes have to be developed and implemented in a consensual 
way together with all relevant actors, such as farmers, environmentalists, interest groups and 
the administration. Moreover, scientific system rationality and stakeholders know-how was 
combined to reach locally adapted and sustainable solutions. Hence, the methodology and the 
principles of Participatory Action Research were employed within this transdisciplinary pro-
ject. Various sub-projects were carried out to implement and further develop strategies that 
had been identified together with local actors. They covered issues like sustainable tourism, 
regional marketing, regional planning and agricultural extension as well as regionalised agri-
environmental policies (Müller et al. 2002). The objectives of the project group which initi-
ated the AEF were to develop and to test approaches in order to a) increase the ecological and 
economic efficiency of agri-environmental schemes, b) motivate more farmers to participate 
in those schemes and c) strengthen the democratic basis of agri-environmental transfer pay-
ments. Empirically, this Section is based on participatory observations and notes taken at the 
                                                 
4  The Prenzlau-West region is situated in the north of Brandenburg in the district Uckermark. It covers about 
15,000 hectares of agricultural land - about 8 % of the districts agricultural land - that is farmed by 20 
agricultural firms (Sattler, Schuler and Zander 2004) 
5  Undoubtedly, the process of developing the LAES, i.e. dynamics and aspects within the AEF, might have 
also contributed to the failure to integrate the LAES in Brandenburgs RDP. Those aspects, however, will not 
be focused on in this paper but are discussed in a comprehensive and critical way by Arzt et al. 2002 and Arzt 
2003. 
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AEF meetings, on interviews with local stakeholders, and, in particular, on meetings and in-
terviews with representatives of the relevant Brandenburg ministries.  
3.1 Concept and Activities of the AEF Prenzlau-West 
The AEF can be described as a permanent round table where, on average, 15 local actors, 
such as farmers and environmentalists but also representatives of administrations and associa-
tions at local and district level, were discussing local agri-environmental issues. The partici-
pants exchanged information on these issues and discussed and agreed on ways and measures 
to tackle related problems. The AEF can be characterised as an institutional experiment that 
was initiated by the GRANO scientists to explore chances and barriers of shifting specific 
elements of decision making in the field of agri-environmental policy to regional actors. The 
forum was designed along basic principles of stable and sustainable structures of self-
organisation as described, e.g., by Selle (1996) and Ostrom (1998). The meetings were organ-
ised and supported by a team of six GRANO scientists and moderated by an experienced pro-
fessional. In particular, regular communication among participants as well as high levels of 
transparency, equality and representativeness were aimed at. The basic concept of the AEF is 
described in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Basic concept of the Agri-Environmental Forum 
Source: compiled by the authors 
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Before initiating the forum, the project group carried out an in-depth situation analysis based 
on qualitative, semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders. Moreover, plans, regional 
statistics, and other available information for the region were included. The kick-off meeting 
in September 1999 was followed by 13 successive meetings until the GRANO project ended 
in February 2002. At the first meetings, the participants of the AEF agreed to successively 
deal with the agri-environmental problems related to Sölle (small, undrained pools that are 
typical for the north Brandenburg region), soil (wind) erosion and hedgerows. The discussion 
of these issues in the forum was regularly facilitated by presentations by local actors as well 
as by GRANO and non-GRANO scientists and other experts in order to collect all available 
information necessary to identify or design the most suitable measures to solve the problems. 
The measures developed by the AEF to deal with the first two issues were compiled in a 
LAES with an option to add measures related to other issues, such as hedgerows, at a later 
date. As Table 1 shows, the LAES predominantly contains classic measures, such as Turning 
arable land in extensively used grassland, that have already been part of the current agri-
environmental scheme in Brandenburg. In contrast to the current scheme, however, only plots 
with a high risk of soil erosion6 were eligible - one of the core innovations of the LAES. 
The scheme also includes new locally-adapted measures, such as Protection of Sölle.  
Table 1: Individual measures of the LAES, developed by the AEF 
Measure Remarks 
Protection of Sölle Combined with regular EU set-aside premium 
Permanent set-aside of 
ecologically sensitive parts 
of arable land 
Only plots with higher risk of soil erosion are eligible; 
Measure of current scheme, but not open in 2000 and 2001 
Non-plough tillage Only plots with high risk of soil erosion are eligible; 
Measure within old scheme under Regulation  
(EEC) No. 2078/1992, not included in current scheme 
Permanent soil cover all-
the-year (e.g., intercrops) 
Only plots with high risk of soil erosion are eligible; 
Similar measure in current scheme  
Turning arable land in ex-
tensively used grassland 
Only plots with high risk of soil erosion are eligible; 
Measure of current scheme, but not open in 2000 and 2001 
Purchase of wide tyres Investment financed by Article 33, Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 
Source: compiled by the authors 
                                                 
6  Based on Deumlich, Thiere and Völker (1997), a threshold level of six tons per ha per year (potential level of soil 
erosion) had been agreed on by the participants of the AEF.  
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3.2 Realisation of the Local Agri-Environmental Scheme 
Since the GRANO projects funding by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research did 
not include funding of implementation of the results or measures developed within the pro-
ject, it was a major concern from the very beginning to seek for options of external financing. 
For this reason, the Brandenburg Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry (MELF) and the 
Brandenburg Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Regional Planning (MUNR) 
were approached for financing the forums results as early as in 1999.7 At the beginning of the 
GRANO project, both ministries had been very fond of the projects approach and goals. 
However, MLUR officials pointed out that they would not be able to provide extra money to 
finance future schemes developed by the AEF given Brandenburgs poor budget situation. As 
main alternative, however, they rendered support to integrate future scheme(s) - from 2001 
onwards - as so-called demonstration projects in the RDP that had been submitted recently 
to the EU under Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999. Thus, the Land only had to provide 25 % of 
the total costs; 75 % of the funding was covered by the EU. However, Brandenburgs total 
amount of funding of any agri-environmental scheme in the region was not to rise above the 
present level. Furthermore, only very few and fairly vague further alternatives for external 
funding, such as mixed funding from various development associations, etc., were suggested. 
As a consequence, special attention was paid to keep the individual measures exactly in line 
with the guidelines defined by Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 while elaborating the LAES. 
At a follow-up meeting with MLUR officials in November 2000 it was again stressed that 
there would be no extra money to finance any scheme. Furthermore, the officials complained 
that so far the project group had not delivered any marginal cost calculations at farm level that 
could prove that the locally adapted scheme would indeed be more advantageous over the 
current scheme in terms of both participating farmers and economic and ecological efficiency. 
It was also pointed out that funding as demonstration project was no longer an option since 
the EU had not confirmed this specific part of the submitted RDP.  
Thus, the only option left was to replace the current scheme by the newly developed one. 
Again, however, the Lands funding of the new Scheme was not to exceed the present level. 
The project group was asked to deliver plausible figures, such as the number of farmers that 
would potentially apply for the local scheme, the acreage that would be covered and the 
money that would be needed. After the LAES was finally confirmed by the members of the 
                                                 
7  Both Ministries were merged to the Brandenburg Ministry for Agriculture, Environmental Protection and 
Regional Planning (MLUR) later in 1999. 
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AEF in November 2000 fake application forms containing the new measures were posted to 
all farmers in the Prenzlau-West region asking them to indicate their actual interest to partici-
pate in the new scheme once confirmed by the EU. The draft scheme was also informally 
posted to the responsible administrators of the European Commission, Directorate General of 
Agriculture who confirmed that this scheme would most probably be accepted as a local sub-
stitute provided that Brandenburg submitted it to the EU. In August 2001, the local scheme 
was finally submitted to the MLUR. The document included plausible statements and calcula-
tions both on the acceptance (acreage, number of participants, necessary funds) and on the 
higher economic and ecological efficiency of the local scheme compared to the current 
scheme. An official response, however, came only in December 2001 when a MLUR official 
was invited to a meeting of the AEF. He appreciated the effort made by the forum to develop 
such a scheme, but he also pointed out that changing the RDP, i.e. resubmitting it to the EU, 
would not be possible before the Mid-Term Review in 2003. For the time being, there would 
be no other option as to wait until this date since this plan could only be changed once. 
Although neither the GRANO project itself nor the MLUR did ever guarantee that there 
would be any money available to remunerate farmers for measures developed by the AEF, the 
willingness of most local actors - including the farmers - to participate regularly at the meet-
ings was surprisingly high. Most participants continued to attend the meetings of the AEF 
even after the Scheme had been sent to the MLUR without receiving any positive statement 
regarding financial support. It is important to note that the majority of the participants had 
been profoundly sceptical at the beginning if there would be any assistance from the Land 
Brandenburg at all.  
4 Embedding of Decentral and Participatory Approaches 
While from an environmental policy perspective the response of MLUR might be considered 
frustrating we argue that, from an institutional perspective, the response is not surprising. It 
would have been very easy to interpret the reaction as unwillingness of the regional admini-
stration to implement new and innovative schemes. There is no question, given the strong per-
sonal commitment of the researchers in the participatory process, that this was the immediate 
and intuitive argument to apply. However, the question remained, assuming that the regional 
ministrys reluctance was based on farm lobbying influence, why the administration should 
reject a proposal that had seemingly a strong backing from farmers themselves? Hence, after 
the emotional dust settled, that had gone up at final stages of the project, we started to re-
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examine our empirical material trying to understand the constraints, which shaped the minis-
trys behaviour. Thus, in the first part of this Section we will analyse the arguments that have 
been brought forward in the discussion. Based on the case presented, in the second part we 
address the issue of decentralisation in terms of embedding or nesting of local participatory 
approaches into the institutional order of the current agri-environmental policy framework of 
the CAP. Drawing on experiences we made within the GRANO project our analysis high-
lights several issues that need further attention in future research.  
4.1 Failing to realise the Local Agri-Environmental Scheme 
During the negotiations, several political and administrative reasons that would impede the 
implementation of the measures have been brought forward by the MLUR. Table 2 provides 
an overview of the most critical factors, which we further elaborate in this Section.  
Table 2: Critical factors that contributed to the failure of implementing the LAES 
1 Issue of financing: 
Poor budgetary situation of Brandenburg 
2 Administrative concerns: 
New measures might complicate the administration of agri-environmental schemes and 
cause increased administration costs  
3 Changing the RDP: 
Only possible once during period 2000 to 2006 
4 Missing proof of comparative advantage: 
of LAES in terms of ecological and economical efficiency 
5 Distribution: a) within district; b) between districts  
Source: compiled by the authors 
At the beginning, the budget constraints for the (future) local scheme seemed to be most criti-
cal. Indeed, in the agri-environmental context Brandenburgs poor budgetary situation is re-
flected, for instance, by the fact that in the first two operational years of Regulation (EC) No. 
1257/1999 several measures of the RDP were not opened. That means, farmers were not 
allowed to apply for all measures contained in the plan because the MLUR could not guaran-
tee that their financial means to co-finance (25 % of the total) would be sufficient. Yet another 
indicator for Brandenburgs strained financial position is that, from 2004 onwards, the Con-
tractual Nature Conversation Schemes based on individual contracts between farmers and the 
regional nature protection authorities will only be continued in designated nature protection 
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areas. Since these individual contracts have been more flexible in terms of measure design 
and compensation level, and more open to subsequent adjustments, they have been very popu-
lar with farmers. These schemes have been financed exclusively by the Land, i.e. without EU 
co-financing. Brandenburgs budgetary situation, however, has been worsening over the last 
decade, resulting in decreasing funds for these schemes, and finally leading to the decision to 
integrate those measures in the recently updated RDP that is co-financed by the EU. Thus, EU 
co-funding of agri-environmental schemes for agriculturally used areas becomes even more 
important. Of course, the amount of money available in a specific policy field, such as agri-
environmental policy, is in the first place determined by political priorities, notwithstanding 
the actual - good or poor - budgetary situation. The LAES presented, however, would have 
(completely) substituted the current scheme. Consequently, no additional funds would have 
been needed to finance it. Still, the MLUR refused continuously to implement the scheme. 
Thus, in our case, the poor-budget argument - generally a strong argument - does not offer a 
sufficient explanation for the MLURs resistance. 
In the light of Brandenburgs strained budget, the GRANO project group was also seeking 
for alternative sponsors, such as associations for nature protection and landscape conserva-
tion; finally without success. Due to strained financials and/or specific priorities, none of the 
associations approached have been willing and/or able to finance such a rather complex 
scheme completely. Mixed financing, however, would have resulted in a complicated and 
volatile structure. Integrating the AEF in a Leader+8 group was another option pursued. 
Again, the negotiations failed since the Leader+ region approached only covered parts of the 
AEF region. Furthermore, the AEF was not perceived as a local initiative since it had been 
initiated and organised by non-local GRANO scientists.  
Administrative concerns were a second line of argument on part of the MLUR. It was ar-
gued that an increased variety of measures might complicate the administration of agri-
environmental schemes and, thus, cause increased administration costs. In particular, MLUR 
officials were worried about new measures that might be more difficult to monitor or might 
entail more complicated - and labour-intensive - application processes. Indeed, in contrast to 
                                                 
8  Leader+ is one of four initiatives financed by EU structural funds and is designed to help rural actors 
consider the long-term potential of their local region. Encouraging the implementation of integrated, high-
quality and original strategies for sustainable development, it has a strong focus on partnership and networks 
of exchange of experience. A total of over five billion Euro for the period 2000-2006 will be spent, of which 
2.1 billion Euro is funded by the EAGGF Guidance section and the remainder by public and private 
contributions (European Commission 2004).  
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the current scheme, some measures of the new scheme were only eligible on plots with a 
certain high risk of soil erosion. On the one hand, this would require an appropriate and reli-
able data basis on which to decide whether a specific plot was eligible or not (see also Foot-
note 6). On the other hand, this would mean an additional step of approval in the applica-
tion process that could only be handled by the districts environmental agency which was 
usually not involved in the administration of schemes within the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy. Undoubtedly, both aspects would have far-reaching implications for administrative pro-
cedures and costs: Preparing reliable maps on a regions risk of soil erosion is costly and time 
consuming; changing field-tested administrative routines and/or integrating other adminis-
trative departments would entail processes that, above all, are more error-prone. For the case 
presented, however, the actual rise of administrative costs and efforts might have been man-
ageable because the project group had already provided a soil erosion data basis and the 
LAES only contained two measures that had not been part of the previous and current agri-
environmental schemes.9 
Having this in mind, one could assume that the MLUR anticipated a possible scenario with 
many dozens AEF each presenting one (or even more) LAES potentially disarranging and, at 
least, substantially challenging administrative structures and procedures in Brandenburg. This 
scenario might indeed, at least in the introductory phase, come along with a higher work load 
and costs for the administration, and it might also boost the risk regarding the monitoring pro-
cess. Thus, for administration officials it was reasonable to assume that implementation costs, 
i.e. transaction costs would be higher.  
Closely related to the administrative concerns presented in the previous paragraph, a third 
line of argument has been brought forward by the MLUR. In December 2001, a MLUR offi-
cial affirmed - that it was not possible to change the RDP more than once during its term of 
validity, i.e. the years 2000 to 2006. This statement, however, is not corresponding with the 
Regulations (EC) No. 1257/1999 and No. 1750/1999 that allow for an annually update. At 
least, the LAES might have been integrated in the RDP and resubmitted to the EU in the con-
text of the Mid-Term Review due in 2003. As was frequently pointed out by MLUR officials, 
modifying - and resubmitting - the RDP would cause considerable additional administrative 
work given - last but not least - the rather complex internal political dynamics. Again, a new 
                                                 
9  Furthermore, there would have been nearly no increase in monitoring costs, since the overall portfolio of 
available measures was even smaller than in the current scheme and the monitoring and evaluation of AEF 
measures would not have required new or complicated methods or procedures. 
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compromise about the new tentative plan would be necessary. Furthermore, there would also 
be a certain risk that the resubmitted plan could be rejected by the EU. This would be espe-
cially true if the plan included innovative elements, such as the LAES, that were not in accor-
dance with the mainstream. It may be important to stress that Brandenburg already experi-
enced those difficulties by implementing a very specific measure according to Article 20 of 
the Rural Development Regulation. Even if we can act on the assumption that the European 
Commission would have actually accepted the AEF measures in question, it could not be 
formally proven. We also have to bear in mind the timing. In the years 2000 and 2001, when 
negotiations with the MLUR took place, the Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 was only just 
approved and adopted and all administrative levels were quite busy to get familiar with this 
new regulation and the new RDP. At that period of time, we argue, the willingness for ex-
periments or further changes on part of the administration may have been reduced.  
In this context of presumably higher administrative costs and risks we also have to assess 
the fourth argument of the MLUR that relates to a missing proof of the superiority of the 
LAES to the current scheme in terms of ecological and economic efficiency as well as accep-
tance by farmers. On the level of a concrete measure it was only fair to ask the project group 
to come forward with precise calculations and sound arguments in order to support the appro-
priateness of the measure and the level of compensation since the EU was expecting the 
MLUR to provide this kind of information when drawing up or changing the RDP. Conse-
quently, this kind of information was included in the LAES proposal, but considered as insuf-
ficient by the Ministry without bothering to specify the deficits. Furthermore, the project 
group argued that all agri-environmental measures, that were actually being carried out in the 
Prenzlau-West region within the current scheme, were also part of the new scheme. In the 
new LAES, however, only plots with a certain high risk of soil erosion were eligible for those 
measures intended to reduce soil erosion. Hence, the money would be spent more targeted 
compared to the current situation and without abdicating locally accepted measures. Ironi-
cally, the apparently higher level of goal orientation and efficiency provoked the fifth argu-
ment of the MLUR: Farmers who received payments under the current system might be ex-
cluded under the new scheme because their plots would not be eligible anymore. However, 
such discrimination against those farmers might have negative income effects, and this, if 
plots with poor soils were concerned, could result in land abandonment. Furthermore, it 
would interfere with the solidarity principle, widely adopted in Brandenburg. 
Apart from the distribution within a district, the MLUR underlined another kind of dis-
crimination, i.e., the unfair distribution between districts. According to the concept of the 
20  Jörg Eggers, Lutz Laschewski, Christian Schleyer 
 
GRANO project it was intended to develop and to test local schemes in (only) two sub-district 
regions, i.e. in the Prenzlau-West region and in the Schraden region in the south of Branden-
burg. Consequently, only those farmers within these selected regions were exclusively author-
ised to participate in the local schemes. Currently, there is differentiation of this kind between 
Member States and between the Laender in Germany only. If this is called discrimination, 
the AEF approach would simply lead to a decentralisation of discrimination. In principle, it 
would have been possible to open the LAES, including the newly developed measures, to 
all farmers in Brandenburg. In this case, however, the comparative advantage of locally 
adapted measures would have been lost. As a model of thought one could assume that each 
district implements its own AEF that is developing its own measures and, subsequently, pro-
viding them to the Land, thus compiling an extensive shopping list. The final decision of 
which measures were relevant for the region and should hence be opened to the farmers in 
this district, would rest with the district administration. This would require a shift of compe-
tence with regard to the design of measures and the respective decision making from Land to 
district level10.  
4.2 General Obstacles to Implement Decentral and Participatory Approaches  
To sum up, it is certainly difficult to precisely answer the question which single aspect was - 
or which combination of aspects were - finally decisive for the rejection - or neglect - of the 
LAES by the regional ministry. Reflecting all arguments mentioned above, we argue, that 
they did (and do) not constitute prohibitive formal reasons against the implementation of the 
LAES as - at least - some kind of pilot-scheme. Instead, we argue that five other aspects con-
tributed greatly to the failure of the scheme implementation: First, MLUR officials were an-
ticipating the administrative consequences, risks and costs resulting from a Land-wide im-
plementation of AEF in Brandenburg. The second aspect concerns the legitimacy of the AEF. 
The third aspect refers to missing incentives on part of the administration. This point is very 
closely connected with the fourth point, the definition of the subsidiarity principle that was 
introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. Somehow relevant for all points is our fifth point, the 
interest of the actors and the actor-constellation, where we consider several aspects as, e.g., 
path dependencies:  
                                                 
10  We are aware of the fact that even a district can be quite heterogeneous in terms of agricultural structure and 
environmental features, and that, therefore, a further decentralisation of agri-environmental decision making 
by establishing more than one AEF per district might be sensible. 
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1. As was already pointed out, MLUR officials were anticipating a possible scenario with 
many dozens AEF and LAES which might have been a substantial burden for the admin-
istrative structures and procedures in Brandenburg. Higher work load and costs for the ad-
ministration would be the unavoidable effects of this kind of decentralisation. Even though 
this was not explicitly mentioned by the officials, the risk connected with the implementa-
tion of the LAES, i.e. the risk of rejection of a changed RDP, might have been estimated as 
prohibitively high. This holds even more true due to the unfavourable timing of the presen-
tation of the LAES which took place nearly simultaneously with the implementation of the 
new Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999. 
2. In contrast to its forerunner Regulation (EEC) No. 2078/1992, the Regulation (EC) No. 
1257/1999 does not provide a chapter for any kind of pilot schemes, so-called demonstra-
tion projects. Thus, the LAES would have constituted a complete (regional) substitute to 
the current scheme. In this case, however, the legitimacy of the activities and the results of 
the AEF becomes an important issue. Here, several questions have to be answered: What 
role can such a forum of non-elected representatives play within a given democratic and 
decentral (Laender) administrative and political system? In its present form, the AEF has 
no formal and legal decision making power in this system. It can rather be seen as some 
kind of local advisory committee that is preparing and proposing catalogues of measures to 
official administrative bodies within the federal system. So far, however, there are no clear 
and binding procedures to implement these measures. The critical aspect of the AEFs le-
gitimacy applies also for the design of its internal decision making processes since only a 
consensus rule was applied (Arzt 2003). More formal by-laws might provide more differ-
entiated decision rules including appropriate sanctioning mechanisms. For the definition 
and the comprehensiveness of formal by-laws, it is crucially important to decide whether 
or not and which competencies (rights and duties) shall be delegated to such a local institu-
tion, e.g., the choice of relevant measures and eligible plots and/or even the monitoring of 
correct application of the measures, etc. Furthermore, formal by-laws and the composition 
of the AEF participants should reflect the socio-cultural context and, hence, have to be 
adapted to specific national, regional or even local conditions.  
3. Another fundamental explanation is the missing incentives for the administration at Land 
and district level to actively support the AEF and the new scheme: In principle, the 
GRANO approach seems to be in line with the European rural development policy, follow-
ing the subsidiarity principle as quoted in the Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 ...given the 
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diversity of the Community's rural areas, rural development policy should follow the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity; whereas it should therefore, be as decentralised as possible and em-
phasis must be on participation and a bottom up approach (European Commission 1999: 
L160/81). Referring to this approach, Lowe and Brower (2000: 334) even predict that in 
the short and medium term, the most significant implications of the Regulation concerns 
potential changes in procedure that could lay the basis for new institutional structures for 
rural development programming and support, around which over time the larger CAP 
could be transformed. The experiences made with the AEF and with the attempts to im-
plement its results, however, do not support their rather optimistic predictions. Two aspects 
are important here: First, although the Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 does indeed for-
mally encourage policies that are as decentralised as possible, emphasising the role of 
participatory and bottom-up approaches, it still neither provides clear incentives to promote 
decentralisation below the Laender level nor does it ask for any kind of local institutional 
innovations. Second, the Commissions requirements for agri-environmental schemes in 
terms of design, implementation, application procedures, controlling, monitoring and 
evaluation is fairly demanding for the respective administrations at Laender and district 
levels, i.e. bottom-up approaches also have to meet these requirements and, thus, heavily 
depend on substantive support from the respective administrations.  
4. For both aspects mentioned above, the subsidiarity principle that was introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty, should be relevant. As stated in the protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, however, 
the application of the subsidiarity principle is only demanded from the European institu-
tions but not from the Member States (Treaty of Amsterdam). Referring to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the question arises whether subsidiarity has any relevance for the individual Mem-
ber State at all. Indeed, there is no reason why it should be the EU and not the Member 
States to decide on the degree of decentralisation of agri-environmental schemes. Thus, 
any initiative in this field rests with the respective Member State or Land. Even in case the 
Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 would provide an active support for institutional innova-
tions, there is no guarantee that the interests of the Member States or Laender, respec-
tively, are in line with the EU interests. Both aspects, the passive support for decentral-
ised and participatory approaches, and the insistence on complex bureaucratic procedures 
with regard to agri-environmental schemes might lead to the question how much participa-
tion and regionalisation the European Commission really wants. To answer this question, it 
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has to be investigated how officials of the European Commission actually handle applica-
tions for local approaches to be implemented at sub-district level. Furthermore, it has to be 
analysed in which way and to what extent the bureaucratic effort connected with the im-
plementation of such local approaches might prevent steps towards more decentralisation 
(Eggers 2005).  
5. Analysing the interests of the officials in the Member States and in the Laender in Ger-
many, respectively, seems to be even more complex. One rather obvious objective might 
be to transfer as much money as possible from the EU to the respective Land and, thus, to 
increase - or at least to stabilise - the farmers income. Officials from other EU depart-
ments, e.g., the Department of the Environment, might rather aim at directing more money 
to environmental issues (Eggers and Hagedorn 1998).  
Apart from the aspect referred to in the last, fifth, bullet, the number and the degree of differ-
entiation of measures is mainly restricted by three concerns that are - at present - central for 
Brandenburgs authorities when designing agri-environmental schemes:  
First, funds are preferably distributed equally within the regions rather than according to other 
objectives. Obviously, the distribution argument has to be seen in relation with payments 
made in the first pillar of the CAP, i.e. the direct payments. Until the recent reform in 2003, 
the composition of those payments has favoured arable production and intensive animal hus-
bandry. Given the nature of Brandenburgs main agricultural problem, i.e. maintaining agri-
culture in less favoured areas, the agri-environmental schemes are obviously seen as instru-
ments to make agricultural subsidies accessible to those farmers that are not eligible to other 
(direct) payments. In Brandenburgs agri-environmental scheme, this is reflected, first, in the 
fact that most of the money is directed to compensatory measures in less favoured areas with-
out additional environmental requirements - focussing on meadows and extensive grazing - 
and, second, in the fact that environmental requirements of most measures are easy to be met 
by farmers. The agri-environmental scheme, therefore, functions as a tool to compensate some 
of the perceived (distribution-related) unfairness of the CAP itself.11 
                                                 
11  Furthermore, there is a particular environmental discourse in Brandenburg focussing on the need to expand 
environmental protected areas, triggered by EU legislation (e.g., Flora-Fauna-Habitat Directive), while being 
confronted with a declining Land budget. This conflict has resulted in reallocation of significant shares of the 
budget for Contractual Nature Conservation Schemes funded by the Land Brandenburg to the so-called 
Article 16-scheme - compensation payments for areas with environmental restrictions that are based on 
Community environmental protection rules - within the EU co-financed RDP. Thus, the distribution among 
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Second, potentially higher costs for political negotiations and managing more differenti-
ated bundles of measures have to be considered: designing agri-environmental schemes in-
cludes negotiation processes between the ministry of the respective Land and the EU. In order 
to be eligible for EU co-funding, the ministry has to prove that the content and the designated 
formal procedures, such as monitoring and sanctioning, of the RDP comply with EU regula-
tions. However, the ministry has also to negotiate with the parliament of the Land, and, de-
pending on the structure of the scheme, with authorities at the federal level in order to obtain 
co-funding.  
Third, completely new measures and procedures are not easily implemented in the political 
and administrative system; e.g., formal procedures for the approval may be difficult and 
costly in terms of money and time, and the actual effects of these new measures and proce-
dures are perhaps uncertain. Thus, there is a common strategy to copy - or only slightly mod-
ify - measures and procedures that have been either already established in the Land or proven 
to be successful in other regions. This is in line with Douglas North stressing the (often 
retarding) role of path dependencies when looking at institutional change (North 1990). 
Within an existing institutional framework, therefore, institutional change will most likely 
take place only in an incremental way, e.g., caused by changes in the regional power 
structures or in the European Rural Development Regulation. However, none of these changes 
necessarily imply increasing efficiency or effectiveness. 
For these reasons, measures are often copied from already existing agri-environmental 
schemes that have already been approved by the EU, and distributed within the Land as even 
as possible. In contrast, from the administration point of view, more targeted measures or 
schemes are making the negotiation and approval process more complicated and they carry a 
higher risk of financial correction. In the case presented, however, the failure to implement 
the LAES was also due to the fact that the Land Brandenburg provides neither any scope for 
institutional innovations nor any procedures how to implement results of local institutions, 
such as the AEF. This concerns issues such as a) how to finance results, b) how to assess the 
economic and ecological efficiency of the developed schemes, and c) how to assess the im-
pacts on administration costs. Beyond that, a concept for interaction of local institutions with 
administrative and political bodies at district level is missing. In the absence of clear proce-
                                                                                                                                                        
environmental and agricultural budgets is another important issue (Laschewski, Matzdorf and Schleyer 
2004). 
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dures, success of decentral institutions seemingly depend on the Land’s budgetary position, 
the Land’s political priorities, and the availability of funding alternatives within the Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) sector. Furthermore, the motivation and competence of 
local actors as well as their ability to lobby at all political levels, the levels of risk aversion on 
part of the relevant administrative and political authorities at all levels and their openness to 
innovative approaches play an important role. We assume that this holds true not only for the 
Brandenburg case. 
5 Conclusions 
The paper started with the observation of a rather divers uptake of agri-environmental 
schemes in Europe and a lack of effectiveness and efficiency of current agri-environmental 
schemes. In the literature we presented, several arguments to explain these facts can be found. 
However, we considered those explanations as insufficient and, instead, we suggested that the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiencies were inherent to the way agri-environmental schemes are 
currently institutionalised in the framework of European agricultural policies. In our case 
study we outlined that the process of designing agri-environmental schemes in Germany can 
be conceptualised as a rather complex negotiation process at the Laender level. The institu-
tional settings in which this negotiation process takes place shape the possible outcomes and, 
thus, the design of the schemes. Paradoxically, this may even lead to outcomes which the EU 
itself did not intend in the first place.  
Since decentral approaches beyond the Laender level are not explicitly provided for by the 
relevant EU Regulations, there is no necessity for federal or Laender governments to support 
or implement any kind of local organisations, such as the AEF. On the contrary, the tight 
rooms for manoeuvre within the current Rural Development Regulation rather increase risks, 
work load and costs for the regional administration when trying to implement such local par-
ticipatory approaches. 
Regarding the EU, better incentives to promote participation and decentralisation below 
Laender level as well as active support of local participatory approaches should be provided. 
For example, a special chapter supporting demonstration projects could be integrated into 
Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999. Decentralisation, however, does not only mean shifting 
competencies and responsibilities to administrations at district level. It also implies, that par-
ticipatory approaches at the local level require modifications of rules and procedures at all 
levels of the multi-level system of European agri-environmental policy. Otherwise, one would 
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suspect that higher administrative costs and efforts that might come along with the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Local Agri-Environmental Schemes are not 
outbalanced by their increased acceptance and their higher ecological and economic effi-
ciency. Clearly, much more research is needed in order to better understand the respective 
political and institutional determinants of such processes. 
Finally, it can not be expected that the lack of effectiveness and efficiency can be wiped 
out completely from the current European Agri-environmental Policy framework. Any policy 
framework will have certain blind spots due to transaction costs and rent-seeking activities 
involved. Therefore, we should also refine the central questions to be addressed in future re-
search into: What kind of problems can actually be solved within the given framework? and 
Which alternative policies are required to cope with the weaknesses of the current system? 
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